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GUEST ACT OF 1930 UNCONSTITUTIONAL*
Fayette Circuit Court
MOLLIE GREEN Plaintiff
VS. OPINION
CLARENCE WAi..Ma R - -_-Defendant
1. MOToR VEHicm.--Guest Act of 1930 is unconstitutional.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL ,LAw.-Section 241 and Section 54 of the
Constitution construed.
The question submitted in this action involves the constitu-
tionality of Chapter 85 of the Acts of 1930, which was approved
March 21, 1930, and will be found on Page 253 of the Acts.
That act, including its title, is as follows:
"AN ACT releasing owners of motor vehicles from responsibility for
Injuries to passengers therein. Be it enacted by the General As-
sembly of the Commonwealth of Kentuky: First: No person trans-
ported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, as his guest,
without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of
action for damages against such owner or operator for any injuries
received, death, or any loss sustained, in case of accident, unless
such accident shall have resulted from an intentional act on the
part of said owner or operator."
Section 241 of the Constitution of Kentucky says, in part:
"Whenever the death of a person shall result from injury
inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every case,
damages may be recovered for such death from the corporation
or person so causing the same."
This Section was evidently inserted in the Constitution
because of the possible uncertainty of the common law and the
general statutes, and to relieve the uncertainty in the law as to
the person who had the right to institute an action for death
caused by the negligence or wrongful act of another.
*This is the first of a series of certain of Judge Richard C. Stoll's
opinions rendered while Judge of the Fayette Circuit Court. In many
instances they discuss the constitutionality of statutes and questions
of law not as yeb passed upon by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
The Kentucky Law Journal is indebted to Mr. Gayle Mohney who has
assisted In selecting and editing them. The opinion in the case of
Green v. Walker, holding the Guest Act passed by the 1930 Legislature
to be unconstitutional, is an excellent one with which to begin the
series.
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Under the common law, no recovery could be had for death,
and a full discussion of the common law will be found in an
opinion of this Court in the case of Ballard v. Co6, which opinion
is referred to and made a part of this opinion, and the clerk
will copy it and attach it hereto as a part hereof.
It will be noticed that the Constitution gives a right of
action when the death results from the negligence or wrongful
act of another party, whereas the act in question. says that no
right of action shall accrue unless the accident results from the
intentional act of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle.
It is a universal rule that where the constitutionality of a
statute is assailed the Court should adopt such a construction,
if possible, without doing violence to its language as will cause
the act to square with the constitution, and an act should be held
constitutional if it can be, done by any legitimate rules of con-
struction, but Courts cannot give a forced construction to make
it constitutional-6 R. C. L., Sec. 77, and the cases therein cited.
This is so because the act has been enacted by a coordinate
branch of government-the Legislature-and was approved or
permitted to become a law by the Governor who represents the
Executive Department of the government, and so the Courts are
reluctant to say that each of two coordinate branches of the
government have done that which the Constitution forbids them
to do.
As illustrating this, the Supreme Court of the United States,
since the adoption of the Constitution, has only declared 43 or 44
acts of Congress unconstitutional, out of the great mass of laws
which have been enacted. The Court must keep these principles
in mind when it considers the constitutionality of the act in
question.
One of the questions which must be considered is whether
an intentional act is a negligent act. Negligence is the failure to
discharge a duty. When there is no duty, there can be no
negligence-C. N. 0. & T. P. Railway Co. v. Harrod's Admr.,
132 Ky. 452; Helnq v. C. N. 0. & T. F. Ry. Co., 156 Ky. 240.
"Negligence is the antithesis of duty. 'Where there is no duty
there can be no negligence." Thomas v. Cincinnati Ry. Co.,
127 Ky. 163, Franklin v. Tracy, 117 Ky. 274. "The doctrine as
to actionable negligence is that it must be a failure to discharge
some duty devolved on the railroad company to the individual
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entitled to the right and not for failure or duty to others than
himself." Brown's Admr. v. L. & N., 97 Ky. 236.
If the act could then be construed to mean that one owes no
duty of any kind to a guest, except to refrain from intentionally
injuring him, then, it might be argued that the principles
announced in the foregoing cases might apply, but I do not
think the act can be so construed.
It is the duty of a person or a railroad company not to kill
another by negligence, but at common law there could be no
recovery for death, but merely because there could be no
recovery did not relieve a person of the duty of not killing
another through negligence-so I do not think th6 act can be so
construed.
In K. & T. Railway Company v. Minton, 167 Ky. 516, the
Court quotes with approval Sherman & Redfield on Negligence,
Sixth Edition, Section 1-(a), where it is said: "Negligence in
law in its widest aspect, having relation to the non-fufilment of
duties, involves the presentation of the entire body of substantive
law, excepting only wrongs unintentionally inflicted
but the term 'negligence' as used in this work and as uniformly
used by courts and text writers, where actionable negligence is
intended, is meant the action of tort for injury unintentionally
inflicted on another, in his person or estate, by the failure to
perform a legal duty owing him."
In Schulte v, L. & N. Railway Co., 128 Ky. 627, the Court
says: "Negligence generally speaking, whether it be ordinary or
gross, is merely the omission to perform a duty, although there
may be instances where gross negligence is of an affirmative
character and amounts to an intentional wrong or a reckless
disregard of the rights of others."
In L. & P. Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9 Bush 525, it is said:
"Willful negligence is equivalent to an intentional wrong." The
words "willfully" and intentionally are synonymous, and
sometimes "willful negligence" is synonymous with "gross
negligence". Jones v. M. & 0. Railway Co., 127 S. W. 144,
B. T. & T. Co. v. Sims, 99 Ky. 404. But willful negligence is a
creature of the statutes, being unknown to the common law, and
it means intentional negligence.
C. & 0. v. Yost, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 834.
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It is very doubtful whether the words "intentional act",
as used in the act in question, may be considered as embracing
any degree of negligence, but for the sake of this opinion the
Court will assume, but not decide, that the words "intentional
act" mean gross negligence. The question then arises-can the
Legislature limit the word "negligence" to a particular degree
of negligence? The word "negligence", at common law, means
every degree of negligence; it is inclusive, and means everything
from the failure to exercise slight care up to the failure to
exercise the utmost care. There are no words limiting the mean-
ing of the word "negligence" in the Constitution, and so the
word must be given its ordinary meaning and the Legislature
has no power to narrow the meaning of this word and make it
apply only to gross negligence, for, if it could, the Legislature
could, by a simple act, amend the Constitution, which it can-
not do.
An intentional act, to be actionable, must be a wrongful act,
and if it is not wrongful it cannot be actionable.
In the case of Howard's Admr. v. Hunter, 126 Ky. 685, the
Court says: "It was the manifest intention of the constitutional
provision (ref. to Section 241) to allow an action to be main-
tained whenever the death of a person was caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act of another, and it is not within the power
of the Legislature to deny this right of action." The Section is
as comprehensive as language can make it. The words "negli-
gent" and "wrongful act" are sufficiently broad to embrace
every degree of tort that can be committed against the person.
A wrongful act may be criminal, willful, wanton, or
reckless. In short, every injury inflicted upon the person without
legal right or excuse is a wrongful act without reference to the
relation existing between the perpetrator and his victim." See
also Randolph's Admr. v. Snyder, 139 Ky. 159; Britton's Adnr.
v. Samuels, 143 Ky. 129.
The act in question takes away the right to recover for
death resulting from the negligence or wrongful act, and so the
Court is compelled to hold that the act, insofar as it takes away
the right of action for death, is unconstitutional. It has been
suggested, however, that even though the act is unconstitutional,
insofan as it takes away the right of action for death, yet it is
constitutional insofar as it applies to injuries.
GUEST ACT OF 1930 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Courts have gone a long way in eliminating portions of
acts as unconstitutional, and in sustaining the remainder of the
acts. Perhaps the latest case is that of State Board of Election
Commissioners v. Coleman, 235 Ky. 24. In that case the Court
had before it the constitutionality of the election law of 1930.
Section 2 of the act fills almost one printed page of the Acts.
At the end of the second sentence in the act, which provides for
the depositing of the ballots in the box, appears this language,
after a semicolon: "Provided that the failure of the voter to
detach the secondary stub shall not invalidate his ballot". The
Court held that this language was unconstitutional, but sus-
tained the constitutionality of the remaining portion of section
2, and the Court said: "That it is competent to declare certain
parts of an act unconstitutional, without affecting the remainder
of it, is no longer an open question, when the discarded, invalid
portion would leave the act in such form and shape as to carry
out its central idea and purpose, and it can be reasonably
presumed that the Legislature would have enacted it with the
invalid portion omitted". See Neutzcl, Clerk, Etc., v. Williams,
191 Ky. 351; State Insurance Board v. Green, 185 Ky. 190;
Commonwealth v. Hatfield Coal Co., 186 Ky. 411, and the cases
cited therein; also the text in 36 Cyc. 976, Section 3, and in
6 R. C. L. Section 121.
Assuming, but not deciding, that the word "death" can be
eliminated, is the remainder of the act constitutional? Section
54 of the Constitution says "The General Assembly shall have
no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries result-
ing in death or for injuries to persons or property".
In the case of State Journal Company v. Workmen's Com-
pensation Board, 161 Ky. 562, the Court had before it the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the first Workmen's Compensa-
tion act. In that case it was contended that the act was uncon-
stitutional because it violated Section 54 of the Constitution.
The Court said: "Under this section the compensation of the
injured man is limited to the amount specified in the schedule of
the act. This constitutes a limitation upon the amount of his
recovery under Section 54 of the Constitution, providing that
the Legislature 'shall have no power to limit the amount to be
recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to
persons or property'. But we think it is within the power and
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right of an employee to waive this limit of recovery for injury,
by contract, if such contract is freely and voluntarily made.
"There may never have been a word or a syllable between
the employer and the employee in regard to a contract for
employment to labor, yet the act provides that such contract
shall be conclusively presumed to have been made between the
employer and employee, if the employee continues to work for
the employer after the employer has posted notices in some con-
spicuous places about his place of business, to the effect that he
has paid his premiums into the fund and accepted the provisions
of the act.
"We will go a little further and examine the provisions of
Section 32 of this act. Suppose the employee, desiring to rely
upon the causes of action given him by the Constitution and laws
of this State, does not accept the so-called benefits of this act,
then, in that event, under Section 32 of this act, the employee,
prior to receiving an injury, is compelled to give notice to his
employer and to the board that he will not accept the provisions
of this act. This notice must be served as provided by the Civil
Code for serving notices.
"So, if, after this notice has been served, the employee
should be injured or killed while in the service of the employer,
he or his personal representative may sue his employer to reover
damages, then his right to recover is barred by the provisions of
this act, if his injury was caused by or contributed to by the
negligence of any other employee of said employer, or if the
injury was due to any of the ordinary hazards or risks of the
employment, or if due to any defect in the tools, machinery,
appliances, instrumentality or place of work, if the defect was
known or could have been discovered by the employer by the
exercise of ordinary care in time to have prevented the injury,
nor in any event if the negligence of the injured employee con-
tributed to such injuries.
"Now, when his right to recover is restricted by such quali-
fications and conditions as these, we think these qualifications
and conditions constitute, within the meaning of Section 54 of
the Constitution, not only a limitation upon the amount to be
recovered, 'but practically destroy his right to recovery."
It will be noticed that the Court held that the act violated
Section 54 of the Constitution, not only because it is a limitation
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on the right to recover for injuries, but practically destroys the
right to recover. In the act in question a recovery is denied, no
matter what the negligence, unless the injury was intentionally
caused. In other words, the act not only limits the recovery but
destroys the right to recover, and if a right to recover is
destroyed it certainly constitutes a limitation on the amount that
can be recovered, for it says you can recover nothing.
The Court is aware that since the introduction of auto-
mobiles many actions have been instituted by guests against
the owner of the motor vehicle, and it seems to be a harsh rule
that if a person asks another to ride, or if a person asks the
owner of the automobile for a ride, in the event of an accident or
injury the owner is liable to a suit by the guest, and the Legis-
lature evidently sought to remedy this ever-growing litigation.
But whatever may have been the reason for the enactment
of the law, a Court cannot declare an act valid if it is contrary to
the Constitution. However reluctant the Court is to declare an
act of the Legislature unconstitutional, yet a Court must never
hesitate to do so, when, in its opinion, it is so.
Chapter 85 of the Acts of 1930 is unconstitutional in its
entirety, as violative of Sections 51 and 241 of the Constitution
of Kentucky.
Counsel will prepare an order and the clerk will make this
opinion a part of the record.
RICHARD C. STOLL.
Judge.
